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The American military assistance programme in Latin America
was explicitly conceived in ideological terms as part of a
general diplomatic strategy. It is only necessary to read
General Robert J. Wood's foreword to Harold Hovey's book1 United
States Military Assistance: a Study of Policies and Practices
to appreciate the point: "It is a program which provides
military equipment and weapons and training to those allied and
friendly nations which share our view as to the threat of inter-
national communism" (p. vi). More recently, Ernest Lefever in
his book2 Spear and Scepter: Army Police and Politics in
Tropical Africa has set as one of his objectives a consideration
of the appropriate nature of U.S. policy on military and public
safety aid for African countries in terms of stability and
security in the area concerned, as defined, of course, by
Washington. It is tempting to suggest that British and French
attitudes to this question are less calculating and even
largely unplanned. It may be more correct to describe them as
wary because of their greater experience of the refreshing
unpredictability of African political response. They may also
have discovered the futility of political engineering of this
kind and learnt to be grateful for accidental benefits accruing
from the residual imperial ties. Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to assume that their actions in providing military assistance
are generally seen as furthering their own national interest.
There is unquestionably a widespread view that the African
and other non-European graduates of Sandhurst and St. Cyr are
imbued with a set of political values congruent with the phi-
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losophy and objectives of those by whom they have been trained.
The object of this short article is to examine the extent to
which this may be true, especially in so far as those trained
in or by Britain are concerned, and the practical consequences
stemming from it. The superficial evidence is contradictory -
outside Africa senior officers trained in the British mode and
even brought up in the same force have behaved apparently
differently in India and Pakistan. Similarly, inside Africa,
in Ghana (1966) and Uganda (1971) presidents not avowedly pro-
Western were overthrown in circumstances not unsatisfactory
from an official British standpoint; but in Nigeria (also in
1966) Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, was
murdered in an abortive military coup at a time when he was
still the favoured African leader in European eyes. Bob Fitch
and Mary Oppenheimer castigated the officers who carried
out the original Ghana coup as Anglo-Africans in Marxist terms
similar to those employed by Jean-Paul Sartre denouncing racial
treachery in his preface to Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth.
They also suggested that the CIA and the British Intelligence
Service using these men as pawns might well have had a hand
in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. A recent article in The
Daily Telegraph (Colour Supplement, January 21st, 1972) by
E.H. Cookridge categorically asserts the role played by the
CIA in this coup and in the setting up as head of state of
Yakubu Göwon in Nigeria, and suggested similar activity in
conjunction with the British in the deposing of President Obote
of Uganda. It seems unlikely, however, that the ending of Dr.
Busia's government in Ghana by Colonel 1.1<. Acheampong was
either engineered by Western agents or greeted with enthusiasm
in Whitehall even though the political stance he has so far
adopted is moderate rather than radical. On this evidence
alone, it would clearly be naive to suppose - and there are
plenty more examples from Nasser onwards to support this -
that those trained by a foreign power necessarily become its
tools. An attempt to relate the content and style of military
education to the subsequent political actions and pronounce-
ments of individuals is, therefore, required.
Generally speaking, Western European military academies
like Sandhurst and St. Cyr are more concerned with the build-
ing up of a pro.fessional ethos than with political education.
At Sandhurst, in particular, where British and overseas cadets
have undergone exactly the same course, the confidence derived
from a long tradition means that many aspects of professional
1 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: the End of an Illusion.
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training are implicit in the example set rather than explicit
and consciously disseminated. An ideal of the military prevails,
It goes without saying that the army should be structurally and
ideologically cohesive with a high level of internal discipline.
It is assumed that officers are publicly regarded and regard
themselves as a main repository of patriotism, dedicated to the
public interest and perhaps imbued with quasi-puritanical
virtues. What is to be questioned is not the prevalence of
this ethos within a closed institution, but its effect on those
from wholly or partly - and Africans have often had a British
style of schooling - alien cultural environments. Though an
interest in the Commonwealth relationship was admittedly culti-
vated during the 1950's, it is doubtful if it can be validly
said that, in any deliberate sense, the political or antipoli-
tical attitudes of the Western military were impressed upon the
African cadet. Nor was or is he wholly isolated during his stay
in Europe from his African contemporaries. In Britain, he nor-
mally has continual opportunity to restore his own cultural
identification through his military contemporaries and student
and other ethnic associations in London.
This is not to say, however, that African officers have
not suffered any strain from divided loyalties. If they were
commissioned before independence, they had the disconcerting
experience of serving a foreign power in the company of ex-
patriates, and even after independence the absorption of the
military institutions fully into the pattern of the new state
was probably a slower process than, for example, with the
civil service. This was partly a function of that characteristic
feature of the Western military - its separateness in physical
terms in barracks or cantonments from the society which it is
supposed to serve. To be in a racial minority in the officer
corps of one's own country and at the same time to be exposed
to the pull of ethnic allegiance during a period when the
political leadership was only slowly coming to appreciate the
armed forces as a national institution was a toughening, not
to say confusing, experience, It would not be surprising,
therefore, if an individual were to rely heavily on the be-
havioural guidance to be derived from certain basic profession-
al tenets. An interesting question is the extent to which the
writings of officers involved in political action reveal the
true nature of the influences to which they were seemingly
responding.
Two of the Ghanaian military elite have written books,
the tone of which has agreeably surprised or shocked readers
according to their ideological standpoints. Within months of
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the overthrow of Nkrumah the then Colonel A.A. Afrifa wrote
and published The Ghana Coup. His received impression of
Sandhurst as a kind of military 'nirvana' where all the simple
virtues are practised is obviously not easy to accept at its
face value: "Now I look baek on Sandhurst with nostalgia...
It is an institution that teaches that all men are equal, that
the profession of men-at-arms is essential, and a peaceful
one. It shows the stupidity of racial conflicts, and the joy
of the communion of all men in the service of peace" or "Sand-
hurst gave us independent thinking, tolerance and a liberal
outlook... There was no discrimination whatsoever". It is
significant that it is not the Royal Military Academy alone
which is the subject of this kind of romantic description.
Afrifa writes also of the British "traditions of integrity,
fair play and above all honour", and refers to Britain as the
home of democracy, while in the same passage he cites the
case of Oliver Cromwell before he eventually distinguishes
between "allegiance and loyalty to the Government of Ghana"
and "allegiance to the people of Ghana". All this amounts
not only to a seemingly exaggerated admiration for the
British way of life but also, and more significantly, to the
acceptance of the British military as the norm to be used in
determining his own behaviour. The fact that by no means all
overseas cadets have left Britain with this kind of impression
and that many of Afrifa's British contemporaries might have
some difficulty in recognizing the institution which he de-
scribes suggests not so much any deliberate indoctrination
but a more accidental result of a convergence of particular
experiences in some individuals. It is clearly a matter of
opinion whether the consequences have been good or bad, but
in either case they are more reasonably attributable to the
inevitable cultural permeation accompanying colonial rule than
to any deliberately conceived policy. Total resistance to the
temptation to exploit the situation was, of course, not to be
expected but there is as yet no convincing evidence to
suggest that General Kotoka and Colonel Afrifa in launching
the original Ghana coup did other than act in accordance with
their own lights by reference to their own experience. That
they might have acted differently if they had been trained
under other auspices is clearly possible, but for an under-
standing of the phenomenon largely irrelevant. Only an officer
corps trained in accordance with an explicitly Ghanaian mili-
tary tradition would have been free from the influence of
external cultural norms and this was impracticable at the
time.
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On matters of domestic politics Major General Albert Ocran
in his book A Myth is Broken reflects an even more simplistic
view than does Afrifa. In a passage of some length he recounts
in detail the changes for the worse in military conditions of
service during the Nkrumah period. Reduced travelling allowances,
increased rents, cancellation of free passages abroad for the
children of service personnel, and increased charges for elec-
tricity all lead to the conclusion "When the British were here
our interests were better protected". Such measures are seen as
wholly discriminatory and never for a moment examined in a
wider context as an aspect of a necessary austerity policy. It
is ironic that this situation was and remains a direct result
of nationalist pressures during decolonization for scales and
allowances for local public servants equivalent to those for
expatriates - a development which for obvious reasons was
generally resisted at first by the colonial power. What is much
more difficult to assess, however, is the real extent of the
identity of men like Ocran and Afrifa with a main strand of
Ghanaian or African nationalism. Are they other than military
representatives of the middle class 'intelligentsia' or 'elite'
which fairly consistently opposed Nkrumah and the CPP? Clearly,
their proclaimed patriotism is not such as to have generated
in them any degree of xenophobia for the white men from whom
they received their training, a feature which some would regard
as characteristic of the typical patriotism of military profes-
sionals. What is probable, however, is an enhancement or mag-
nification of the antipolitical attitudes implicitly fostered
in a military academy as a result of their expatriate colleagues'
tacit attitudes to the leaders of the independence movement. But
again, the Ghana officer corps included men similarly trained
but of a wide range of political attitudes and some were com-
mitted anti-colonialists, at any rate beneath the surface.
The attitudes of Generals Afrifa and Ocran towards ex-
ternal policy may, however, be useful in providing a further
dimension to this discussion. In neither of the cases quoted is
a critical view of the Commonwealth relationship to be found.
Thus, Afrifa writes: "One of the reasons for my bitterness
against Kwame Nkrumah's rule was that he paid only lip-service
to our membership of the Commonwealth of Nations"; Nkrumah, he
goes on to say, made the Commonwealth a mockery "under the
mask of African unity and non-alignment". Ocran refers to
Ghanaian soldiers as dying in the past "to defend the Common-
wealth, their country .and Africa's freedom" in that order, and
this corresponds with another of Afrifa's sentences "1 have
been trained in the United Kingdom as a soldier, and I am ever
prepared to fight alongside my friends in the United Kingdom
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in the same way as Canadians and Australians will do".
The professed faith in Magna Carta and British institutions
generally extends to more topical matters - "I (Afrifa)
personally knew that Her Majesty's Government of the United
Kingdom was quite capable of dealing with the Rhodesian
situation". Strong opposition to cadets training in Russia
may, however, be primarily attributed to a legitimate fear
of the development of factions in an army with different
military traditions tending to emphasize stratification by
rank and age-group, but Ocran does raise the ideological
issue: "The saying that 'East is East and West is West and
never the twain shall meet' came to acquire a new and more
vivid meaning for me when Nkrumah took his leftward turn
and tried to drag the country and the army with him".
Throughout both books a concern, albeit confused, for the
reputation of Ghana in the world is apparent. It is charac-
teristic and understandable that the norm by which this
national reputation should be judged is, as with the stan-
dard of living and life style of the military officer, that
of the one external reference point known at first hand to
the writers. It should, therefore, have been no surprise to
find that the National Liberation Council organized by the
coup leaders including Afrifa and Ocran pursued economic
and foreign policies consonant with a continuing reference
to a Western model. The possible repudiation of the debts
incurred by Nkrumah never seems to have been a factor in
their conduct of affairs in spite of the obvious handicaps
deriving from them; but it has, interestingly, already be-
come a feature of Colonel Acheampong's administration. The
ideological sympathies of these particular men involved in
the overthrow of Nkrumah are not, therefore, seriously in
doubt.
Two aspects are, however, questionable. In the first
place, it may be true that any form of foreign military
training is, because of the unique relationship between the
military and the state, likely to have a comprehensive im-
pact on the trainee. On the other hand, the effects deduced
in the two cases available for analysis seem, from first
hand observation, far from universal. The documentation of
a different Ghanaian example would not, however, be easy,
though in due course it may be possible to discover more of
the attitudes of Major-General Charles Barwah, killed in the
1966 coup. He seems to have understood the apolitical virtue
learnt from the British to imply strictly an unquestioning
and, in the event, fatal support of Nkrumah. In Nigeria,
there was more overt xenophobia expressed in the officers'
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mess before expatriates finally left.
The special significance of Major Nzeogwu's case in this
context is that he was a strict contemporary of Afrifa's at
Sandhurst, training in the same company and receiving an iden-
tical education. And yet his specifically Nigerian nationalism
was not in 1966 ever in dispute. All the evidence goes to
suggest that Dr. Azikiwe was right to describe him and his
associates as 'Young Turks' with the full radical and moderni-
zing implications of the term. In no sense could the January
1966 plot including the assassination of the Sardauna of
Sokoto be attributed to a Western ideology acquired in the
course of military training. Indeed Nzeogwu, on his return to
Nigeria as a commissioned officer, rapidly acquired the repu-
tation amongst British officers of being 'bloody-minded' and
ruthless in assertion of Afro-Nigerian interest. He was in
their view the exact opposite of a somewhat earlier graduate
of Sandhurst - namely Gowon, who, in his turn, suffered in the
eyes of fellow Nigerians for being too westernized, an under-
standable assumption by those who might have seen him in
Britain, in dark suit with rolled umbrella, the formal off-
duty uniform of the British officer of the time.
In his recent book2 The Nigerian Military, Robin Luckham
has provided much fresh evidence of the Nigerian officer
corps' social and political attitudes. In a pastiche of
scarce published material and his own wide personal impressions
he suggests a pervasive ambivalence on the part of the officers
concerned in the January 1966 coups. They were on the one
hand ultra-nationalists with revolutionary objectives, while
at the same time concerned with collective military honour
and their status within a social elite, the values of which
were derived from Western models. The contradiction, apparent in
some of them and in many of their colleagues, between 'the
country gentleman posture of British officers' and strongly
Pan-African or anti-white racial attitudes seemed to go un-
remarked even when heightened by the tensions over the deploy-
ment of mercenaries during the civil war. The conflict between
conformism and revolt remains, Dr. Luckham reasonably claims,
unresolved. The professional ethos as adapted, and perhaps
distorted, to fit a different cultural style seems more in-
fluential than its source.
This problem of the ideological-cultural impact of foreign
military assistance lacks as yet the necessary documentation
1
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for a full comparative study. It is easy to appreciate that
a diversification of military assistance produces as many,
though different, problems as a homogeneous arrangement.
It would be interesting to be able to compare the political
effects of communist and Israeli training in different sectors
of the Uganda air force with MIG and Mirage aircraft respecti-
vely. Colonel Charles Beausoleil of the Ghana Air Force, who
has come to the force in Colonel Acheampong's administration
was both educated at Sandhurst and trained to fly by Israeli
instructors. The ramifications of the training pattern are
almost unlimited. What might be supposed to be the consequences
of Pakistan military training either at cadet or staff level?
Kwame Nkrumah thought it politically potentially dangerous
after the 1958 Pakistani coup and severed the connection.
In some French speaking countries, soldiers like Colonel
A.A. Alley in Dahomey, who were trained in French military
schools from an early age have taken decisive political action
of a conservative kind, while others less thoroughly inbued
with the tradition - for example, in Mali - have adopted a
more radical stance.
The difficulty may well lie in assuming a specific po-
litical consequence of any form of military aid. The Ghanaian
case illustrates well the frustrations inherent in a convent-
ional ideological attribution of behaviour. On present evi-
dence a more logical conclusion at which to arrive may well
be that in many cases the military actually have no socio-po-
litical interest in the ideological sense: their primary con-
cern is for their professional interest and the defence of it
against threats apparently posed by ambitious or misguided
politicians. It might not even be absurd to postulate the
possibility that the coup, in the first instance, is some-
times seen as a step towards the reassertion of the principle
of the non-political army. The domestic stagnation - in socio-
political terms - which has been characteristic of a period
of military rule in many countries suggests a lack of ideo-
logical orientation, while governmental tactics have con-
tinually betrayed a deficiency in political perception. For
example, the National Liberation Council in Ghana from 1966-
69 so far from severing all connections with the Nkrumah
regime often failed to perceive that it was associating with
tainted elements, and imposing a moratorium on all political
activity may actually have prevented the emergence of a
dynamically different grouping. The current malaise now
apparent in General Gowon's government in Nigeria, though the
circumstances are different, seems in some ways parallel. The
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general unwillingness, and perhaps inability,, to interfere
with the civil service, the police and the other public
services uggests that there is no strong political motivation.
The overweening role of the military in many African countries
may be attributed more to the lack of political integration in
the country at large than to any foreign political influence on
the military. In all the circumstances, it seems that the
peculiar character of the elitist military traditions wherever
they are inherited from constitutes a danger to the political
development of politically underdeveloped states. It may be
going too far to suggest that by a quirk of fate a military
tradition has proved not the most difficult but the easiest of
traditions to establish, and that this has led to disequilibrium
and asymmetry in the development of new nations. For this
reason, the search, as in Tanzania, for a new, possibly non-
elitist, formula for a military institution may prove of
particular significance.
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